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DLD-390        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 13-1897 
___________ 
 
 
JOSE NAVARRETE, 
                        Appellant 
 
v. 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS, Warden; 
FEDERAL CORRECTIONS INSTITUTION; LOUISIANA STATE UNIVERSITY;  
BARNES AND NOBLE BOOK STORE, Owner, Louisiana State University;  
EDUCATION SUPERVISOR 
    
 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil No. 1-09-cv-03683) 
District Judge:  Honorable Jerome B. Simandle 
____________________________________ 
 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
August 15, 2013 
Before:  AMBRO, SMITH and CHAGARES, Circuit Judges  
 
(Opinion filed: September 3, 2013) 
 
_________ 
 
OPINION 
_________ 
  
 
PER CURIAM 
 Jose Navarrete, a federal inmate confined at the Federal Correctional Institution at 
Fort Dix, New Jersey (FCI-Fort Dix), appeals from an order of the District Court granting 
defendant’s motion for summary judgment.  Navarrete also appeals the District Court’s 
denial of his motion for reconsideration.  For the reasons that follow, we will summarily 
affirm the judgment of the District Court.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. 
 Navarrete commenced this action against the United States of America, the 
Federal Bureau of Prisons (“FBOP”), the Warden of FCI-Fort Dix, the Education 
Supervisor at FCI-Fort Dix, the President of Louisiana State University (“LSU”), and the 
owner of the Barnes & Noble Book Store at LSU.
1
  He alleged that, while incarcerated, 
he enrolled in a correspondence course at LSU, but that the mailroom at FCI-Fort Dix 
improperly refused delivery of his course textbooks.  As a result, he was unable to 
complete the course.  In his complaint, Navarrete asserted that defendants violated his 
rights under the First, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, and unspecified 
state laws.                                                      
 The District Court dismissed sua sponte for failure to state a claim, all of 
Navarrete’s claims except his First and Fifth Amendment claims against the Warden of 
                                              
1
 Although Navarrete sought relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the District Court construed 
his suit as an action under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the FBI, 403 U.S. 
388 (1971), not § 1983, because it involved federal (and alleged federal) actors rather 
than state actors.  See Bivens, 403 U.S. at 389 (recognizing a private cause of action to 
recover damages against federal actors for constitutional violations).    
  
FCI-Fort Dix.  Following discovery, the District Court granted the Warden’s motion for 
summary judgment on Navarrete’s remaining claims.  Navarrete filed a motion for 
reconsideration, which the District Court denied.  This appeal followed. 
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our review of the District 
Court’s dismissal for failure to state a claim, as well as its grant of summary judgment, is 
plenary.  Barefoot Architect, Inc. v. Bunge, 632 F.3d 822, 826 (3d Cir. 2011). 
  We determine that the District Court properly dismissed any Bivens claims 
against the United States, FBOP, and FCI–Fort Dix.2  See Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 
534 U.S. 61, 72 (2001) (holding that Bivens claims may only be brought against 
individual federal officers, not the United States or its agencies).
3
  Navarrete’s 
constitutional claims against LSU and the Barnes and Noble bookstore, both private 
entities, were also properly dismissed.  Corr. Servs. Corp., 534 U.S. at 71.  Moreover, as 
the District Court noted, Barnes and Noble issued Navarrete a refund after the store 
received the returned books.  We also agree, for the reasons given by the District Court, 
                                              
2
 We construe Navarrete’s notice of appeal as also challenging the District Court’s earlier 
order dismissing some of his claims. 
 
3
 To the extent that the complaint could be construed as attempting to assert a claim under 
the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), we agree with the District Court that it did not 
have subject matter jurisdiction under the FTCA.  A claim may not be brought pursuant 
to the FTCA unless the plaintiff has first exhausted his administrative remedies.  See 
White-Squire v. U.S. Postal Serv., 592 F.3d 453, 457 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2675(a)).  This requirement “is jurisdictional and cannot be waived.”  Roma v. United 
States, 344 F.3d 352, 362 (3d Cir. 2003) (citation omitted).  Navarrete does not claim to 
have availed himself of, let alone exhausted, available administrative remedies. 
  
that Navarrete failed to allege any facts demonstrating the denial of any rights under the 
Fourth, Eighth, or Fourteenth Amendments. 
 We further conclude that the District Court properly granted the Warden of FCI-
Dix’s motion for summary judgment on Navarrete’s First and Fifth Amendment claims.  
Even assuming that the return of Navarrete’s course textbooks violated his First and Fifth 
Amendment rights, he did not set forth any evidence upon which a jury could conclude 
that the Warden had any personal involvement in that decision, and a Bivens claim 
cannot be premised upon a theory of respondeat superior.  See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 
662, 675-77 (2009); Argueta v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, 643 F.3d 60, 
71-72 (3d Cir. 2011).    
 Finally, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Navarrete’s 
motion for reconsideration, as it did not include any of the grounds required for 
reconsideration.  See  Lazaridis v. Wehmer, 591 F.3d 666, 669 (3d Cir. 2010) (per 
curiam) (Rule 59 motion “must rely on one of three grounds: (1) an intervening change in 
controlling law; (2) the availability of new evidence; or (3) the need to correct clear error 
of law or prevent manifest injustice”). 
